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Abstract—In the Open Data approach, governments and other
public organisations want to share their datasets with the public,
for accountability and to support participation. Data must be
opened in such a way that individual privacy is safeguarded.
The Privacy Funnel is a mathematical approach that produces
a sanitised database that does not leak private data beyond a
chosen threshold. The downsides to this approach are that it
does not give worst-case privacy guarantees, and that finding
optimal sanitisation protocols can be computationally prohibitive.
We tackle these problems by using differential privacy metrics,
and by considering local protocols which operate on one entry
at a time. We show that under both the Local Differential
Privacy and Local Information Privacy leakage metrics, one
can efficiently obtain optimal protocols. Furthermore, Local
Information Privacy is both more closely aligned to the privacy
requirements of the Privacy Funnel scenario, and more efficiently
computable. We also consider the scenario where each user has
multiple attributes, for which we define Side-channel Resistant
Local Information Privacy, and we give efficient methods to
find protocols satisfying this criterion while still offering good
utility. Finally, we introduce Conditional Reporting, an explicit
LIP protocol that can be used when the optimal protocol is
infeasible to compute, and we test this protocol on real-world
and synthetic data. Experiments on real-world and synthetic data
confirm the validity of these methods.
Keywords—Privacy funnel; local differential privacy; in-
formation privacy; database sanitisation; complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an extended version of [18]. Under the Open
Data paradigm, governments and other public organisations
want to share their collected data with the general public.
This increases a government’s transparency, and it also gives
citizens and businesses the means to participate in decision-
making, as well as using the data for their own purposes.
However, while the released data should be as faithful to the
raw data as possible, individual citizens’ private data should
not be compromised by such data publication.
Let X be a finite set. Consider a database ~X =
(X1, . . . , Xn) ∈ Xn owned by a data aggregator, containing a
data item Xi ∈ X for each user i (For typical database settings,
each user’s data is a vector of attributes Xi = (X1i , . . . , X
m
i );
we will consider this in more detail in Section V). This data
may not be considered sensitive by itself, but it might be
correlated to a secret Si. For instance, Xi might contain the
age, sex, weight, skin colour, and average blood pressure of
person i, while Si is the presence of some medical condition.
To publish the data without leaking the Si, the aggregator
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Figure 1. Model of the Privacy Funnel with local protocols.
releases a privatised database ~Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), obtained
from applying a sanitisation mechanism R to ~X . One way
to formulate this is by considering the Privacy Funnel:
Problem 1. (Privacy Funnel, [4]) Suppose the joint probability
distribution of ~S and ~X is known to the aggregator, and let
M ∈ R≥0. Then, find the sanitisation mechanism R such that
I( ~X; ~Y ) is maximised while I(~S; ~Y ) ≤M .
There are two difficulties with this approach:
1) Finding and implementing good privatization mecha-
nisms that operate on all of ~X can be computationally
prohibitive for large n, as the complexity is exponential
in n [6][22].
2) Taking mutual information as a leakage measure has as
a disadvantage that it gives guarantees about the leakage
in the average case. If n is large, this still leaves room
for the sanitisation protocol to leak undesirably much
information about a few unlucky users.
To deal with these two difficulties, we make two changes to
the general approach. First, we look at local data sanitisation,
i.e., we consider optimization protocols Q : X → Y , for
some finite set Y , and we apply Q to each Xi individually;
this situation is depicted in Figure 1. Local sanitisation can
be implemented efficiently. In fact, this approach is often
taken in the Privacy Funnel setting [20][6]. Second, to ensure
strong privacy guarantees even in worst-case scenarios, we
take stricter notions of privacy, based on Local Differential
Privacy (LDP) [15]. For these metrics, we develop methods
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to find optimal protocols. Furthermore, for situations where
the optimal protocol is computationally unfeasible to find,
we introduce a new protocol, Conditional Reporting (CR),
that takes advantage of the fact that only Si needs to be
protected. Determining CR only requires finding the root of
a onedimensional increasing function, which can be done fast
numerically.
A. New contributions
In this paper, we adapt two Differential Privacy-like pri-
vacy metrics to the Privacy Funnel situation, namely Local
Differential Privacy (LDP) [15] and Local Information Privacy
(LIP) [13][24]. We modify these metrics so that they measure
leakage about the underlying S rather than X itself (for
notational convenience, we write S,X, Y rather than Si, Xi, Yi
throughout the rest of this paper). For a given level of leakage,
we are interested in the privacy protocol that maximises the
mutual information between input Xi and output Yi. Adapting
methods from [14] on LDP and [23] on perfect privacy, we
prove the following Theorem:
Theorem 1 (Theorems 2 and 3 paraphrased). Suppose a =
#X , c = #S, and pX,S , as well as a privacy level ε ≥ 0 are
given.
1) The optimal ε-LDP protocol can be found by enumerating
the vertices of a polytope in a2 − a dimensions defined
by a(c2 − c) inequalities.
2) The optimal ε-LIP protocol can be found by enumerating
the vertices of a polytope in a− 1 dimensions defined by
2ac inequalities.
The descriptions of these polytopes, and how they relate
to the optimisation problem, are discussed in Sections III
and IV, respectively. Since the complexity of the polytope
vertex enumeration depends significantly on both its dimension
and the number of defining inequalities [2], finding optimal
LIP protocols can be done significantly faster than finding
optimal LDP protocols. Furthermore, we will argue that LIP
is a privacy metric that more accurately captures information
leakage than LDP in the Privacy Funnel scenario. For these
two reasons we only consider LIP in the remainder of the
paper, although many results can also be formulated for LDP.
A common scenario is that a user’s data X consists of
multiple attributes, i.e. X = (X1, . . . , Xm). Here one can
consider an attacker model where the attacker has access
to some of the Xj . In this situation ε-LIP does not accu-
rately reflect a user’s privacy. Because of this, we introduce
a new privacy metric called Sidechannel-Resistant LIP that
takes such sidechannels into account. We expand the vertex
enumeration methods outlined above to find optimal SRLIP
methods in Section V.
Finding the optimal protocols can become computationally
unfeasible for large a and c. In such a situation, one needs
to resort to explicitely given protocols. In the literature there
is a wealth of protocols that satisfy ε-LDP w.r.t. X . These
certainly work in our situation, but they might not be ideal,
because these are designed to obfuscate all information about
X , rather than just the part that relates to S. For this reason,
we introduce Conditional Reporting (CR), a privacy protocol
that focuses on hiding S rather than X , in Section VI. Finding
the appropriate CR protocol for a given probability distribution
and privacy level can be done fast numerically.
In Section VII, we test the methods and protocols discussed
above on both synthetic and real data. Compared to [18], new
content in this extended paper are Section VI, the experiments
on real data, and the extended literature review.
B. Related work
The Privacy Funnel (PF) setting was introduced in [20],
to provide a framework for obfuscating data in such a way
that the obfuscated data remains as faithful as possible to the
original, while ensuring that the information leakage about a
latent variable is limited. The Privacy Funnel is related to the
Information Bottleneck (IB) [25], a problem from machine
learning that seeks to compress data as much as possible,
while retaining a minimal threshold of information about a
latent variable. In PF as well as IB, both utility and leakage
are measured via mutual information. Many approaches to
finding the optimal protocols in PF also work for IB and vice
versa [17][6]. A wider range of privacy metrics for the Privacy
Funnel, and their relation to Differential Privacy, is discussed
in [24].
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) was introduced in [15]. It
is an adaptation of Differential Privacy [9] to a setting where
there is no trusted central party to obfuscate the data. As a
privacy metric, it has the advantage that it offers a privacy
guarantee in any case, not just the average case, and that it
does not depend on the data distribution. On the downside, it
can be difficult to fulfill such a stringent definition of privacy,
and many relaxations of (Local) Differential Privacy have
been proposed [5][10][8][21]. We are particularly interested
in Local Information Privacy (LIP) [13][24], also called Re-
moval Local Differential Privacy [11]. LIP retains the worst-
case guarantees of LDP, but is less restrictive, and can take
advantage of a known distribution. In the context where only
part of the data is considered secret, many privacy metrics fall
under the umbrella of Pufferfish Privacy [16].
In [14], a method was introduced for finding optimal LDP-
protocols for a wide variety of utility metrics, including mutual
information. The method relies on finding the vertices of
a polytope, but since this is the well-studied Differential
Privacy polytope, its vertices can be described explicitly [12].
Similarly, [23] uses a vertex enumeration method to find the
optimal protocol in the perfect privacy situation, i.e. when the
released data is independent of the secret data. The complexity
of vertex enumeration is discussed in [1][2].
II. MATHEMATICAL SETTING
The database ~X = (X1, . . . , Xn) consists of a data item
Xi for each user i, each an element of a given finite set X .
Furthermore, each user has sensitive data Si ∈ S , which is
correlated with Xi; again we assume S to be finite (see Figure
1). We assume that each (Si, Xi) is drawn independently from
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the same distribution pS,X on S × X which is known to
the aggregator through observing (~S, ~X) (if one allows for
non-independent Xi, then differential privacy is no longer an
adequate privacy metric [5][24]). The aggregator, who has
access to ~X , sanitises the database by applying a sanitisation
protocol (i.e., a random function) Q : X → Y to each Xi,
outputting ~Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) = (Q(X1), . . . ,Q(Xn)). The
aggregator’s goal is to find a Q that maximises the information
about Xi preserved in Yi (measured as I(Xi;Yi)) while leaking
only minimal information about Si.
Without loss of generality we write X = {1, . . . , a}, Y =
{1, . . . , b} and S = {1, . . . , c} for integers a, b, c. We omit
the subscript i from Xi, Yi, Si as no probabilities depend on
it, and we write such probabilities as px, ps, px|s, etc., which
form vectors pX , pS|x, etc., and matrices pX|S , etc.
As noted before, instead of looking at the mutual informa-
tion I(S;Y ), we consider two different, related measures of
sensitive information leakage known from the literature. The
first one is an adaptation of LDP, the de facto standard in
information privacy [15]:
Definition 1. (ε-LDP) Let ε ∈ R≥0. We say that Q satisfies
ε-LDP w.r.t. S if
∀y∈Y∀s,s′∈S P(Y = y|S = s)P(Y = y|S = s′) ≤ e
ε. (1)
Most literature on LDP considers LDP w.r.t. X , i.e.
P(Y=y|X=x)
P(Y=y|X=x′) ≤ eε for all x, x′, y. Throughout this paper,
by ε-LDP we always mean ε-LDP w.r.t. S, unless otherwise
specified.
The LDP metric reflects the fact that we are only interested
in hiding sensitive data, rather than all data; it is a specific
case of what has been named ‘pufferfish privacy’ [16]. The
advantage of LDP compared to mutual information is that
it gives privacy guarantees for the worst case, not just the
average case. This is desirable in the database setting, as a
worst-case metric guarantees the security of the private data
of all users, while average-case metrics are only concerned
with the average user. Another useful privacy metric is Local
Information Privacy (LIP) [13][24], also called Removal Local
Differential Privacy [11]:
Definition 2. (ε-LIP) Let ε ∈ R≥0. We say that Q satisfies
ε-LIP w.r.t. S if
∀y∈Y,s∈S e−ε ≤ P(Y = y|S = s)P(Y = y) ≤ e
ε. (2)
Compared to LDP, the disadvantage of LIP is that it depends
on the distribution of S; this is not a problem in our scenario,
as the aggregator, who chooses Q, has access to the distribu-
tion of S. The advantage of LIP is that is more closely related
to an attacker’s capabilities: since P(Y=y|S=s)P(Y=y) =
P(S=s|Y=y)
P(S=s) ,
satisfying ε-LIP means that an attacker’s posterior distribution
of S given Y = y does not deviate from their prior distribution
by more than a factor eε. The following lemma outlines
the relations between LDP, LIP and mutual information (see
Figure 2).
ε-LDP
2ε-LDP
ε-LIP
I(S;Y ) ≤ ε
ε-SRLIP
Multiple attributes,
see Section V
Figure 2. Relations between privacy notions. The multiple attributes setting
is discussed in Section V.
Lemma 1. (See [24]) Let Q be a sanitisation protocol, and
let ε ∈ R≥0.
1) If Q satisfies ε-LDP, then it satisfies ε-LIP.
2) If Q satisfies ε-LIP, then it satisfies 2ε-LDP, and
I(S;Y ) ≤ ε.
Remark 1. One gets robust equivalents of LDP and LIP
by demanding that Q satisfy ε-LIP (ε-LDP) for a set of
distributions pS,X , instead of only a single distribution [16].
Letting pS,X range over all possible distributions on S × X
yields LIP (LDP) w.r.t. X .
In this notation, instead of Problem 1 we consider the
following problem:
Problem 2. Suppose pS,X is known to the aggregator, and
let ε ∈ R≥0. Then, find the sanitisation protocol Q such
that I(X;Y ) is maximised while Q satisfies ε-LDP (ε-LIP,
respectively) with respect to S.
Note that this problem does not depend on the number of
users n, and as such this approach will find solutions that are
scalable w.r.t. n.
III. OPTIMIZING Q FOR ε-LDP
Our goal is now to find the optimal Q, i.e., the protocol that
maximises I(X;Y ) while satisfying ε-LDP, for a given ε. We
can represent any sanitisation protocol as a matrix Q ∈ Rb×a,
where Qy|x = P(Y = y|X = x). Then, ε-LDP is satisfied if
and only if
∀x :
∑
y
Qy|x = 1, (3)
∀x, y : 0 ≤ Qy|x, (4)
∀s, s′, y : (QpX|s)y ≤ eε(QpX|s′)y. (5)
As such, for a given Y , the set of ε-LDP-satisfying sanitisation
protocols can be considered a closed, bounded, convex poly-
tope Γ in Rb×a. This fact allows us to efficiently find optimal
protocols.
Theorem 2. Let ε ∈ R≥0. Let Q : X → Y be a ε-LDP
protocol that maximises I(X;Y ), i.e., the protocol that solves
Problem 2 w.r.t. LDP.
1) One can take b = a.
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2) Let Γ be the polytope described above, for b = a. Then
the optimal Q corresponds to one of the vertices of Γ.
Proof. The first result is obtained by generalising the results
of [14]: there this is proven for regular ε-LDP (i.e., w.r.t. X),
but the arguments given in that proof hold just as well in our
situation; the only difference is that their polytope is defined
by the ε-LDP conditions w.r.t. X , but this has no impact on
the proof. The second statement follows from the fact that
I(X;Y ) is a convex function in Q; therefore its maximum on
a bounded polytope is attained in one of the vertices.
This theorem reduces the search for the optimal LDP
protocol to enumerating the set of vertices of Γ, a a(a − 1)-
dimensional convex polytope.
One might argue that, since the optimal Q depends on
pS,X , the publication of Q might provide an aggregator with
information about the distribution of S. However, information
on the distribution (as opposed to information of individual
users’ data) is not considered sensitive [19]. In fact, the reason
why the aggregator sanitises the data is because an attacker
is assumed to have knowledge about this correlation, and
revealing too much information about X would cause the
aggregator to use this information to infer information about S.
IV. OPTIMIZING Q FOR ε-LIP
If one uses ε-LIP as a privacy metric, one can find the
optimal sanitisation protocol in a similar fashion. To do this,
we again describe Q as a matrix, but this time a different one.
Let q ∈ Rb be the probability mass function of Y , and let
R ∈ Ra×b be given by Rx|y = P(X = x|Y = y); we denote
its y-th row by RX|y ∈ Ra. Then, a pair (R, q) defines a
sanitisation protocol Q satisfying ε-LIP if and only if
∀y : 0 ≤ qy, (6)
Rq = pX , (7)
∀y :
∑
x
Rx|y = 1, (8)
∀x, y : 0 ≤ Rx|y, (9)
∀y, s : e−ε ps ≤ ps|X RX|y ≤ eε ps . (10)
Note that (10) defines the ε-LIP condition, since for a
given s, y we have
ps|X RX|y
pS
= P(S=s|Y=y)P(S=s) =
P(Y=y|S=s)
P(Y=y) .
(In)equalities (8–10) can be expressed as saying that for every
y ∈ Y one has that RX|y ∈ ∆, where ∆ is the convex closed
bounded polytope in RX given by
∆ =
v ∈ RX :
∑
x vx = 1,
∀x : 0 ≤ vx,
∀s : e−ε ps ≤ ps|X v ≤ eε ps
 . (11)
As in Theorem 2, we can use this polytope to find optimal
protocols:
Theorem 3. Let ε ∈ R≥0, and let ∆ be the polytope above.
Let V = {v1, . . . , vM} be its set of vertices. For vi ∈ V , let
H(vi) be its entropy, i.e.
H(vi) = −
∑
x∈X
vx ln(vi,x). (12)
Let αˆ be the solution to the optimisation problem
minimiseα∈RM
M∑
i=1
H(vi)αi (13)
subject to ∀i : αi ≥ 0, (14)
M∑
i=1
αivi = pX . (15)
Then the ε-LIP protocol Q : X → Y that maximises I(X;Y )
is given by
Y = {i ≤M : αˆi > 0}, (16)
qi = αˆi, (17)
Rx|i = vi,x, (18)
for all i ∈ Y ⊆ {1, . . . ,M} and all x ∈ X . One has b ≤ a.
Proof. This was proven for ε = 0 (i.e., when S and Y are
independent) in [23], but the proof works similarly for ε > 0;
the main difference is that the equality constraints of their (10)
will be replaced by the inequality constraints of our (10), but
this has no impact on the proof presented there.
Since linear optimization problems can be solved fast, again
the optimization problem reduces to finding the vertices of
a polytope. The advantage of using LIP instead of LDP is
that ∆ is a (a− 1)-dimensional polytope, while Γ of Section
III is a(a − 1)-dimensional. The time complexity of vertex
enumeration is linear in the number of vertices [1], while the
number of vertices can grow exponentially in the dimension of
the polyhedron [2]. Together, this means that the dimension
plays a huge role in the time complexity, hence we expect
finding the optimum under LIP to be significantly faster than
under LDP.
V. MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES
An often-occuring scenario is that a user’s data consists of
multiple attributes, i.e., X = (X1, . . . , Xm) ∈ X = X 1 ×
· · · × Xm. This can be problematic for our approach for two
reasons:
1) Such a large X can be problematic, since the computing
time for optimisation both under LDP and LIP will
depend heavily on a.
2) In practice, an attacker might sometimes utilise side
channels to access some subsets of attributes Xji for some
users. For these users, a sanitisation protocol can leak
more information (w.r.t. to the attacker’s updated prior
information) than its LDP/LIP parameter would suggest.
To see how the second problem might arise in practice,
suppose that X1i is the height of individual i, X
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i is their
weight, and Si is whether i is obese or not. Since height is
only lightly correlated with obesity, taking Yi = X1i would
satisfy ε-LIP for some reasonably small ε. However, suppose
that an attacker has access to X2i via a side channel. While
knowing i’s weight gives the attacker some, but not perfect
knowledge about i’s obesity, the combination of the weight
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from the side channel, and the height from the Yi, allows the
attacker to calculate i’s BMI, giving much more information
about i’s obesity. Therefore, the given protocol gives much
less privacy in the presence of this side channel.
To solve the second problem, we introduce a more stringent
privacy notion called Side-channel Resistant LIP (SRLIP),
which ensures that no matter which attributes an attacker
has access to, the protocol still satisfies ε-LIP with respect
to the attacker’s new prior distribution. One could similarly
introduce SRLDP, and many results will still hold for this
privacy measure; nevertheless, since we concluded that LIP
is preferable to LDP, we focus on SRLIP. For any subset
J ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, we write X J = ∏j∈J X j and its elements
as xJ .
Definition 3. (ε-SRLIP). Let ε > 0, and let X = ∏mj=1 X j .
We say that Q satisfies ε-SRLIP if for every y ∈ Y , for every
s ∈ S, for every J ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, and for every xJ ∈ X J one
has
e−ε ≤ P(Y = y|S = s,X
J = xJ)
P(Y = y|XJ = xJ) ≤ e
ε. (19)
In terms of Remark 1, Q satisfies ε-SRLIP if and only if it
satisfies ε-LIP w.r.t. pS,X|xJ for all J and x
J . Taking J = ∅
gives us the regular definition of ε-LIP, proving the following
Lemma:
Lemma 2. Let ε > 0. If Q satisfies ε-SRLIP, then Q satisfies
ε-LIP.
While SRLIP is stricter than LIP itself, it has the advantage
that even when an attacker has access to some data of a
user, the sanitisation protocol still does not leak an unwanted
amount of information beyond the knowledge the attacker
has gained via the side channel. Another advantage is that,
contrary to LIP itself, SRLIP satisfies an analogon of the
concept of privacy budget [9]:
Theorem 4. Let X = ∏mj=1 X j , and for every j, let
Qj : X j → Yj be a sanitisation protocol. Let εj ∈ R≥0
for every j. Suppose that for every j ≤ m, for every
J ⊆ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . ,m}, and every xJ ∈ X J , Qj
satisfies εj-LIP w.r.t. pS,X|xJ . Then
∏
j Qj : X →
∏
j Yj
satisfies
∑
j ε
j-SRLIP.
The proof is presented in Appendix A. This theorem tells
us that to find a ε-SRLIP protocol for X , it suffices to find a
sanitisation protocol for each X j that is εm -LIP w.r.t. a number
of prior distributions. Unfortunately, the method of finding an
optimal ε-LIP protocol w.r.t. one prior pS,X of Theorem 3 does
not transfer to the multiple prior setting. This is because this
method only finds one (R, q), while by (7) we need a different
(R, q) for each prior distribution. Therefore, we are forced to
adopt an approach similar to the one in Theorem 2. The matrix
Qj (given by Qjyj |xj = P(Qj(xj) = yj)) corresponding to
Qj : X j → Yj satisfies the criteria of Theorem 4 if and only
if the following criteria are satisfied:
∀xj :
∑
yj
Qjyj |xj = 1, (20)
∀xj , yj : 0 ≤ Qjyj |xj , (21)
∀J, xJ , s, yj : e−ε/m(Qj pXj |xJ )yj ≤ (Qj pXj |s,xJ )yj , (22)
∀J, xJ , s, yj : (Qj pXj |s,xJ )yj ≤ eε/m(Qj pXj |xJ )yj . (23)
Similar to Theorem 2, we can find the optimal Qj satisfying
these conditions by finding the vertices of the polytope defined
by (20–23). In terms of time complexity, the comparison to
finding the optimal ε-LIP protocol via Theorem 3 versus find-
ing a ε-SRLIP protocol via Theorem 4 is not straightforward.
The complexity of enumerating the vertices of a polytope
is O(ndv), where n is the number of inequalities, d is the
dimension, and v is the number of vertices [1]. For the ∆ of
Theorem 3 we have d = a − 1 and n = a + 2c. In contrast,
the polytope defined by (20–23) satisfies d = aj(aj − 1) and
n = (aj)2 + 2c
∏
j′ 6=j(a
j′ + 1). Finding v for both these
polytopes is difficult, but in general v ≤ (nd). Since this grows
exponentially in d, we expect Theorem 4 to be faster when
the aj are small compared to a, i.e., when m is large. We will
investigate this experimentally in the next section.
VI. EXPLICIT PROTOCOLS
The methods of Sections III and IV allow us to find the
optimal LDP and LIP protocols. The complexity depends
heavily on a and c, and can become computationally infeasible
for large a and c. For such datasets, one has to rely on prede-
termined privacy algorithms. We consider two approaches: as
a benchmark, we discuss how ‘standard’ LDP protocols can be
applied to the Privacy Funnel situation, and we introduce a new
method, Conditional Reporting, that is meant to address the
shortcomings of standard LDP protocols. As in the previous
section, we focus on LIP, but much of the discussion carries
over to LDP as well.
A. Standard LDP protocols
In the literature, there are many examples of protocols
Q : X → Y , depending on a privacy parameter α, whose
output satisfies α-LDP with respect to X; for an overview
see [28]. Such a protocol automatically satisfies α-LDP, hence
certainly α-LIP, with respect to S. However, because X is only
indirectly correlated with Y , such a protocol’s actual LIP value
may be lower. We can find the privacy of such a protocol Q
by
LIP(Q) = max
y∈Y,s∈S
∣∣∣∣ln
∑
xQy|x px|s∑
xQy|x px
∣∣∣∣ ; (24)
then Q satisfies ε-LIP if and only if LIP(Q) ≤ ε.
For this paper we are mainly interested in two protocols.
The first one is Generalised Rapid Response (GRR) [27].
We are interested in GRR because for large enough α it
maximises I(X;Y ) [14]. Given α, GRR is a privacy protocol
GRRα : X → X given by
GRRαy|x =
{ eα
eα+a−1 , if x = y,
1
eα+a−1 , if x 6= y.
(25)
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A direct calculation then shows that
LIP(GRRα) = max
x,s
∣∣∣∣ln 1 + (eα − 1) px|s1 + (eα − 1) px
∣∣∣∣ . (26)
If we want GRR to satisfy ε-LIP, we then need to solve
LIP(GRRα) = ε for α. Since LIP(GRRα) is increasing in
α, this can be done fast computationally.
The second protocol that is relevant to this paper is Opti-
mised Unary Encoding (OUE) [26]. This protocol is notable
for being one of the protocols that has the least known variance
in frequency estimation [26]. For a choice of α as privacy
parameter, and an input x, the output of OUEα : X → 2X is
a vector of independent Bernoulli variables Ex′ for x′ ∈ X ,
satisfying
P(Ex′ = 1) =
{
1
2 , if x
′ = x,
1
eα+1 , if x
′ 6= x. (27)
In other words, If we identify a y ∈ 2X with a subset of X
(so #y denotes its cardinality), we get
OUEαy|x =
{
e(a−#y)α
2(eα+1)a−1 , if x ∈ y,
e(a−#y−1)α
2(eα+1)a−1 , if x /∈ y.
(28)
It follows that
LIP(OUEα) = max
y,s
∣∣∣∣∣ln 1 + (eα − 1)
∑
x∈y px|s
1 + (eα − 1)∑x∈y px
∣∣∣∣∣ . (29)
B. Conditional Reporting
In general, a generic LDP protocol will not be ideal for our
situation, since these are designed to obscure all information
about X , rather than just the part that holds information
about S. To address this shortcoming, we introduce the Condi-
tional Reporting (CR) in Algorithm 1. This mechanism needs
both S and X as input; hence it differs from the other protocols
discussed in this paper, which only have X as input. The value
of S is masked by Randomised Response. If the output s˜
equals S, we return the true value of X . If not, we output a
random one, whose probability distribution is given by pX|s˜.
Algorithm 1: Conditional Reporting (CRα)
Input : Privacy parameter α; Probability distribution
pS,X ; input (s, x) ∈ S × X
Output: y ∈ X
Sample S˜ ∈ S with
P(S˜ = s′) =
{
eα
eα+#S−1 , if s
′ = s,
1
eα0+#S−1 , otherwise
if s˜ = s then
y ← x;
else
Sample x˜ ∈ X with P(x˜ = x′) = px′|s˜;
y ← x˜;
end
CRα certainly satisfies α-LDP, hence α-LIP, w.r.t. S. How-
ever, if S and X are not perfectly correlated, we can get better
privacy, as outlined by the proposition below.
Proposition 1. Given a probability distribution pX,S and a
α ≥ 0, define
L(α) = max
x,s
∣∣∣∣∣ln (eα − 1) px|s +
∑
s′ px|s′
(eα − 1) px +
∑
s′ px|s′
∣∣∣∣∣ . (30)
Then CRα satisfies ε-LIP if and only if ε ≥ L(α).
The proof is presented in Appendix A. One can use this
proposition to find the α needed to have CRα satisfy ε-LDP,
by solving L(α) = ε. At the very least one has the following
upper bound:
Proposition 2. The protocol CRα satisfies α-LDP. In partic-
ular, it satisfies α-LIP, and L(α) ≤ α.
Proof. For all y ∈ X and s ∈ S we have, following equation
(45) in Appendix A, that
P(CRα(X,S) = y|S = s) = 1eα+c−1
(
eα py|s +
∑
s′ 6=s
py|s′
)
.
(31)
It follows that
P(CRα(X,S) = y|S = s)
P(CRα(X,S) = y|S = s′)
=
eα py|s +py|s′ +
∑
s′′ 6=s,s′ py|s′′
py|s +eαpy|s′ +
∑
s′′ 6=s,s′ py|s′′
(32)
≤ max
{
1,
eα py|s +py|s′
py|s +eαpy|s′
}
(33)
≤ eα.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
We test the feasibility of the different methods by per-
forming small-scale experiments on synthetic data and real-
world data. All experiments are implemented in Matlab and
conducted on a PC with Intel Core i7-7700HQ 2.8GHz and
32GB memory.
A. Synthetic data: LDP vs LIP
We compare the computing time for finding optimal ε-LDP
and ε-LIP protocols for c = 2 and a = 5 for 10 random
distributions pS,X , obtained by generating each ps,x uniformly
from [0, 1] and then normalising. We take ε ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2};
the results are in Figure 3. As one can see, Theorem 3
gives significantly faster results than Theorem 2; the average
computing time for Theorem 2 for ε = 0.5 is 133s, while for
Theorem 3 this is 0.0206s. With regards to the utility I(X;Y ),
since ε-LDP implies ε-LIP, the optimal ε-LIP protocol will
have better utility than the optimal ε-LDP protocol. However,
as can be seen from the figure, the difference in utility is
relatively low.
Note that for bigger ε, both the difference in computing time
and the difference in I(X;Y ) between LDP and LIP become
less. This is because of the probabilistic relation between S
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Figure 3. Comparision of computation time and I(X;Y ) for ε-LDP
protocols found via Theorem 2 and ε-LIP protocols found via Theorem 3,
for random pS,X with c = 2, a = 5, and ε ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}.
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Figure 4. Comparision of computation time and I(X;Y ) for ε-LDP
protocols found via Theorem 2 and ε
2
-LIP protocols found via Theorem 3,
for random pS,X with c = 2, a = 5, and ε ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}.
and X , for ε large enough, any sanitisation protocol satisfies
ε-LIP and ε-LDP. This means that as ε grows, the resulting
polytopes will have fewer defining inequalities, hence they will
have fewer vertices. This results in lower computation times,
which affects LDP more than LIP. At the same time, the fact
that every protocol is both ε-LIP and ε-LDP will result in the
same optimal utility.
In Figure 4, we compare optimal ε2 -LDP protocols to
optimal ε-LIP protocols. Again, LIP is significantly faster than
LDP. Since ε-LIP implies ε2 -LDP, the optimal
ε
2 -LDP has
higher utility; again the difference is low.
B. Synthetic data: LIP vs SRLIP
We also perform similar comparisons for multiple attributes,
for c = 2, a1 = a2 = 3 and a3 = 4, comparing the methods of
Theorems 3 and 4. The results are presented in Figure 5. As
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Figure 5. Comparison of computation time and I(X;Y ) for
ε-(SR)LIP-protocols found via Theorems 3 and 4, for random pS,X with
c = 2, a1 = a2 = 3, a3 = 4, and ε ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}.
one can see, Theorem 4 is significantly slower, with Theorem
3 being on average 476 times as fast. There is a sizable
difference in utility, caused on one hand by the fact that ε-
SRLIP is a stricter privacy requirement than ε-LIP, and on the
other hand by the fact that Theorem 4 does not give us the
optimal ε-SRLIP protocol.
C. Adult dataset
We also test the utility of Conditional Reporting (CR),
both on real world data and synthetic data. We consider the
well-known Adult dataset [7], which contains demographic
data from the 1994 US census. For our tests, we take
S ∈ {marital status, occupation} (with c = 7 and c = 15,
respectively) and X ∈ {education, relationship, sex} (with
a = 16, 6, 2). Based on our findings in the previous sections,
we take LIP as a privacy measure, and I(X;Y ) as a utility
measure. We compare CR on the one hand with the optimal
method (Opt-LIP) found in Section IV, and on the other
hand with the established LDP protocols GRR and OUE. The
results are shown in Figure 6. For X = education, the mutual
information for OUE was infeasible to compute. Similarly,
for S = occupation, some cases of Opt-LIP failed to compute
within a reasonable timeframe. Nevertheless, we can conclude
that GRR and CR both perform somewhere between Opt-LIP
and OUE. As the LIP value ε grows larger, GRR and CR
grow close to Opt-LIP. At the same time, OUE falls off for
large ε, having 12 H(X) as its limit. This is because OUE only
has probability 12 transmitting the true X (as element of the
set Y ). The difference between GRR and CR is less clear,
and it appears to depend on the joint distribution pX,S which
protocol gives the best utility.
D. Synthetic data: GRR vs CR
To investigate the difference between GRR and CR, we
apply both methods to synthetic data. We disregard OUE as
it performs worse than the other two protocols, especially in
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(a) S = marital status, X = education (b) S = occupation, X = education
(c) S = marital status, X = relationship (d) S = occupation, X = relationship
(e) S = marital status, X = race (f) S = occupation, X = race
Figure 6. Experiments on the Adult dataset.
the low privacy regime. For a fixed choice of a and c, we
draw a number of probability distributions from the Jeffreys
prior on S ×X , i.e. the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with
parameter 12 . We fix a set of LIP values ε, and for each of
these and each probability distribution, we solve equations (26)
and (30), setting the left hand side equal to ε and solving for
αGRR and αCR. We then calculate the mutual information
I(X;Y ), which we normalise by dividing by H(X). The
resulting averages and standard deviations are displayed in
Figure 7. On the whole, we see that the larger a is compared
to c, the more utility CR provides compared to GRR. However,
this does not tell the whole story, as the difference between
datasets has more impact on the utility than the difference
between methods.
E. GRR and CR parameter α
To investigate what property of the probability distribution
pXS causes CR to outperform GRR, we consider the param-
eters αCR and αGRR that govern the privacy protocols CR
and GRR. Both of these have the property that the higher
their value, the less ‘random’ the protocols are, resulting in a
better utility. Since these α are found from ε through different
equations, the difference in utility of GRR and CR for different
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(a) a = 5, c = 2 (b) a = 2, c = 5
(c) a = 5, c = 5 (d) a = 3, c = 5
(e) a = 5, c = 7 (f) a = 7, c = 5
Figure 7. Experiments on synthetic data. For each value of a and c, the average utility is taken over 100 randomly generated
probability distributions. Bar size denotes standard deviation.
probability distributions may be explained by a difference
in α. We test this assertion for 100 randomly generated
distributions in Figure 8. As can be seen, the difference in
mutual information can for a large part be explained by a
difference in α (ρ = 0.9815, ρ = 0.9889, and ρ = 0.9731,
respectively). In Figure 9, we plot the relation between α and
the LIP value ε for the experiments in 6(b) and 6(d). The
fact that αGRR > αCR in 9(a) corresponds to the fact that
GRR outperforms CR in 6(b), and the opposite relation holds
between 9(b) and 6(d).
Unfortunately, we were not able to relate the differ-
ence in parameter α to other properties of the distribution.
Without presenting details we mention that the properties
I(X;S),maxx,s px,s,maxx px and maxs ps do not appear to
have an impact on the difference in utility between GRR and
CR.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Local data sanitisation protocols have the advantage of
being scalable for large numbers of users. Furthermore, the
advantage of using differential privacy-like privacy metrics
is that they provide worst-case guarantees, ensuring that the
9
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Figure 8. Difference in α versus difference in utility for 100
randomly generated probability distributions, for a = c = 5.
privacy of every user is sufficiently protected. For both ε-LDP
and ε-LIP we have derived methods to find optimal sanitisation
protocols. Within this setting, we have observed that ε-LIP has
two main advantages over ε-LDP. First, it fits better within
the privacy funnel setting, where the distribution pS,X is (at
least approximately) known to the estimator. Second, finding
the optimal protocol is significantly faster than under LDP,
especially for small ε. If one nevertheless prefers ε-LDP as
a privacy metric, then it is still worthwile to find the optimal
ε
2 -LIP protocol, as this can be found significantly faster, at a
low utility penalty.
In the multiple attributes setting, we have shown that ε-
SRLIP provides additional privacy guarantees compared to
ε-LIP, since without this requirement a protocol can lose
all its privacy protection in the presence of side channels.
Unfortunately, however, experiments show that we pay for this
both in computation time and in utility.
With regard to the specific protocols, we have found that the
newly introduced protocol, CR, generally outperforms OUE,
especially for high values of ε-LIP. It behaves more or less
similar to GRR, and which of these two protocols performs
best depends on properties of the joint distribution pX,S . In
particular, it largely depends on which of the two protocols
has the highest value of their governing parameter α. Also,
we have seen that CR performs better on average if a is large
compared to c.
For further research, a number of important avenues remain
to be explored. First, the aggregator’s knowledge about pS,X
may not be perfect, because they may learn about pS,X
through observing (~S, ~X). Incorporating this uncertainty leads
to robust optimisation [3], which would give stronger privacy
guarantees.
Second, it might be possible to improve the method of
obtaining ε-SRLIP protocols via Theorem 4. Examining its
proof shows that lower values of εj may suffice to still ensure
ε-SRLIP. Furthermore, the optimal choice of (εj)j≤m such
that
∑
j ε
j = ε might not be εj = εm . However, it is
computationally prohibitive to perform the vertex enumera-
tion for many different choices of (εj)j≤m, and as such a
new theoretical approach is needed to determine the optimal
(εj)j≤m from ε and pS,X .
Third, it would be interesting to see if there are other ways
to close the gap between the theoretically optimal protocol,
which may be hard to compute in practice, and general LDP
protocols, which do not see the difference between sensitive
and non-sensitive information. This is relevant because CR
needs both S and X as input, and there may be situations
where access to S is not available.
Although CR outperforms GRR and OUE for some datasets,
it does not do so consistently. More research in the properties
of distributions where CR fails to provide a significant advan-
tage might lead to improved privacy protocols.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 4. For J ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, we write J [j] := J∩{1, . . . , j−1}. Furthermore,
we write X \J = ∏j /∈J X j , and its elements as x\J . We write
ε :=
∑
j ε
j . We then have
py|s,xJ =
∑
x\J
py|x px\J |s,xJ (34)
= pyJ |xJ
∑
x\j
∏
j /∈J
pyj |xj
 px\J |s,xJ (35)
= pyJ |xJ
∑
x\j
∏
j /∈J
pyj |xj pxj |s,xJ[j] (36)
= pyJ |xJ
∏
j /∈J
∑
xj
pyj |xj pxj |s,xJ[j] (37)
= pyJ |xJ
∏
j /∈J
pyj |s,xJ[j] (38)
≤ pyJ |xJ
∏
j /∈J
eε
j
pyj |xJ[j] (39)
≤ eε pyJ |xJ
∏
j /∈J
pyj |xJ[j] (40)
= eε py|xJ . (41)
The fact that e−ε py|xJ ≤ py|s,xJ is proven analogously.
Proof of Proposition 1. Write Qy|x,s = P(CRα(x, s) = y).
Then
Qy|x,s =
∑
s′
P(CRα(x, s) = y|s˜ = s′)P(s˜ = s′|S = s)
(42)
=
eα
eα + c− 1 +
1
eα + c− 1
∑
s′ 6=s
py|s′ , (43)
where δx=y is the Kronecker delta. It follows that
P(CRα(X,S) = y|S = s)
=
∑
x
Qy|x,s px|s (44)
=
eα
eα + c− 1 py|s +
1
eα + c− 1
∑
s′ 6=s
py|s′ (45)
=
eα − 1
eα + c− 1 py|s +
1
eα + c− 1
∑
s′
py|s′ , (46)
P(CRα(X,S) = y)
=
∑
s
P(CRα(X,S) = y|S = s) ps (47)
=
eα
eα + c− 1 py +
1
eα + c− 1
∑
s
∑
s′ 6=s
py|s′ ps (48)
=
eα
eα + c− 1 py +
1
eα + c− 1
∑
s′
py|s′
∑
s6=s′
ps (49)
=
eα
eα + c− 1 py +
1
eα + c− 1
∑
s′
(py|s′ −py,s′) (50)
=
eα − 1
eα + c− 1 py +
1
eα + c− 1
∑
s′
py|s′ . (51)
We find that
L(α) = max
y,s
∣∣∣∣ln P(CRα(X,S) = y|S = s)P(CRα(X,S) = y)
∣∣∣∣ , (52)
hence CRα satisfies ε-LIP if and only if ε ≥ L(α).
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